30 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CODIB

SUBJECT: Recommendations for Task Team V Report

It is recommended that:

1.   A CODIB working group be established and tasked to
design and support the implementation of a program to upgrade
the present interagency National Agency Check (NAC) system
network. Representatives from DoD, Department of State, FBI,
CIA, and NSA should be included and representatives from the
Civil Service Commission, Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, and Secret Service (non-USIB but highly involved
agencies) should be invited to participate. The tasks should
include:

     a. Establishment of common data elements as
required by the participants in the NAC system.

     b. Establishment of a common format acceptable to
all users of the NAC system which will contain both
human and machine readable information.

     c. Monitor and evaluate an experimental link
between two or more agencies to test the possible areas
of improvement and determine guidelines for the
implementation of the full systems.

2.   A CODIB working group be established to identify
specific possible areas of improvement in the positive
biographic area. Representatives from DIA, NSA, Department of
State, CIA, and CODIB/SS should be included. A biographic
intelligence processing plan should be developed by this
group. It should coordinate carefully with the developing
COINS effort and the new CODIB Subcommittee on Standardization.
The present Positive Intelligence biographic system in each
agency should be described. Specific recommendations for

improvements in the existing systems should be made in such
areas as standard data elements, standard request formats,
improved communication facilities, exploitation of source
materials and maintenance of data bases as Intelligence
Community resources.

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MEMORANDUM TO: [   ]
Chairman, CODIB

17 June 1966

SUBJECT: Personal Recommendations with respect to Task Team V's Work.

1. The following are recommendations regarding the future course of the military personalities aspect of biographics that I promised [   ] 25X1A I would submit to you before taking off for C & GS School :

a. Establish a committee of substantively qualified people in the respective agencies to come up with standard data fields, transcription systems, standard ranks, position lists, etc. for the purpose of automating as much of this information as possible. COINS may do some useful work here.

b. Rewrite the pertinent DCID's so that responsibilities for the acquisition, processing, and production of military personality intelligence is clearly and unequivocally fixed. In my opinion, the exploitation of open-source materials for military personalities should be assigned to DOD(DIA).

c. Direct that all interested agencies in the Washington area be tied into the LDX system by a given date, to include the exchange of biographic information. AHS is still not tied in.

d. Stop the proliferation of raw intelligence reports throughout the community and direct interested agencies to the specified agency responsible for producing military personality and military biographic intelligence.

2. In my opinion, the PI side of Task Team V did all it could in the time allotted to learn what files existed of value to them, what was in them, and whom to call to get something in a hurry. Work should now continue with attempts at standardization and more precise definitions of responsibility. Please forgive the brevity. I can give fuller explanations on my return early in July.

CGS-_14446_

22 April 1966
S8-66/217

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CODIB

SUBJECT   :   CODIB Support Staff Comments on
                  Task Team V Report

REFERENCE   :   CGS/MM-76, 7 April 1966

1. Thank you for sending me reference. I feel that further
distribution of this document can only result in a long debate.
Nor is this to be a lengthy rebuttal. I would like to comment on
some of the basic issues in order to clarify the Task Team's outlook,
and to tender some personal observations regarding Task Team efforts
in general.

2. I am confident that most members of Task Team V would agree
that our report is fairly good in its fact finding and suggestions,
pretty weak in terms of action proposals. I am equally sure that
the team would agree that the CSS comments are belated, insensitive
to inter-agency realities, misleading and inaccurate in several re-
spects, and largely devoid of appreciation for the art of the possible.
The team dwelt at great length on many of the issues raised in the
attachment to reference. The team collectively decided, for a mix of
technical, procedural, environmental and policy reasons, that the best
it could do with the time and manpower available was to report as it
did.

3. The basic difficulty, frankly, was a lack of problem defi-
nition on CODIB's part. The team found itself charged with the re-
quirement to identify the biographic problem and make recommendations.
It took the team (composed of people with diverse interests and back-
grounds) several months to come up with Terms of Reference which it
felt to be responsive to CODIB's vague directions. It took several
more months, after the Terms of Reference were approved by CODIB, for
the Team to realize that even these terms were beyond its capacity in
certain respects. It was crystal clear, as things developed, that a
community "biographic plan" was a meaningless phrase.

4. As team thinking coalesced, it became clear to all that it was beyond the powers of such a task team to analyze the problems of each agency in detail. Consequently, the team unanimously endorsed the following wording (page 12, para. 9, page 10, para. 5):

"It was not possible for the Team to consider specifically the relative merits of: (a) the improvement of the manual systems within each agency, (b) the potentials in automation of the index systems within each agency, and (c) the system efficiency that might be realized by the institution of a machine language communication system between the various agencies. These are tasks requiring management supported feasibility studies, dominated by the professionals within each agency, in terms of the unique history and problems of each."

5. But let's go to the heart of the matter. I wonder to what extent CODIB, a committee which reports to another committee, can determine in the first place, and enforce in the second place, rules and standards which have to be applied and interpreted deep within line organizations which pay only token attention to inter-agency committee pronouncements. Can an inter-agency study group ever penetrate even a single organization's workings to the point that it understands the nature of the data, the mission and functions, the dollar and personnel resources, the informal organizational structure and other ingredients which have to be grasped before practical suggestions for change can be made? I find an almost unanimous negative to this question in talking to professional intelligence officers and managers throughout the community, including several of the persons who now serve, or have served, as CODIB members.

6. Reference paper indicates little awareness of the fact that this task team represents, in microcosm, the real world of inter-departmental dynamics. There are problems and differences in each agency which virtually force the individual on a task team to follow the dictates of his own organization, giving either lip service to, or sideways endorsement of, statements of community principle or techniques which may serve his cause.

7. This is neither good nor bad: it is. I feel personally that the better the communication between professionals with management/operational (as opposed to staff) responsibilities, the better our chances of having less lip service and more sideways (or even direct) endorsement of, and follow through on, systems

-3-

integration in the common interest. As matters stand, the very people who are attempting to identify and solve problems in their own agencies are being diverted to unrealistically broad study problems. The more task forces, committees, study groups, etc., dedicated to standardization, data sharing, community "compatibility" and so forth, the more we deplete our already over extended manpower resources throughout the community.

8. What, then? At worst, it should be possible to organize periodic exchanges of user groups, managers and technicians in various subject areas. At best, an inter-departmental staff group such as the CSS might be able to identify discreet problem areas which involve such a glaring diffusion of responsibility, or duplication of processing, that concrete changes in mission and work can be documented and implemented. Just organizing the community to do these apparently simple things will take all the attention, time and staff available.

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Chief, DDP Systems Group

cc - D/OCR

CSS/MM-76
7 April 1966

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CODIB

SUBJECT: Task Team V - Biographics, Final Report

REFERENCES:
(a) USIB/D-39.7/5 16 March 1964
(b) USIB-D-39.7/6 6 May 1964
(c) CODIB-D-III/I.5/3 19 January 1965
(d) T/V/W-1 16 October 1965

1. In reference (a) CODIB recommended that USIB approve
the establishment of an ad hoc task team to "develop a
biographic intelligence processing plan." In reference (b)
USIB approved this CODIB recommendation. Thus, in 1964, it was
obviously the feeling of both CODIB and USIB that there was a
need for a biographic intelligence processing plan. Task
Team V was established to accomplish this task.

2. The Task Team apparently understood its assignment,
at least in the beginning, because reference (d), an early
version of its Terms of Reference, gave the following as its
Objective: "To develop a plan to facilitate the processing and
production of biographic intelligence information within the
Intelligence Community." Later, with the approval of CODIB, the
Task Team changed its objective, as given in reference (c), to
the following: "To identify means for improving the storage,
retrieval and exchange of information from the major name files
and related data files in the Intelligence Community." However,
the Team was reminded by CODIB Support Staff representatives
several times during its deliberations of its original purpose
as approved by USIB.

3. The Final Report of Task Team V does not fulfill the
task for which it was created as stated in reference (a). In
our opinion it falls far short of achieving the objective as
stated in reference (c), the approved terms of reference for
the Task Team.

- 2 -

4. Our detailed comments specifying the reasons for arriving at the above conclusion are given in the attachment to this memorandum.

5. We recommend the following course of action:

a. CODIB should not forward this report to USIB. To send it to USIB as CODIB's response to the original requirement would, in our judgement, reflect very adversely on CODIB.

b. CODIB should now make up its mind whether in 1966 it wants a biographic intelligence processing plan, as it apparently did in 1964. If it does not, then it should find some method of getting off the USIB hook for such a plan. We do not believe that sending this report forward without considerable modification will even do that. If CODIB does want such a plan, then some method must be found to provide the necessary resources to achieve it.

c. Assuming that CODIB does want to develop a biographic intelligence processing plan, we recommend the following:

(1) Establish a task group to develop a processing plan for the positive intelligence biographic activities with members assigned full time to the project until the report to CODIB is completed. (We recommend this course because the Positive and the CI/Security biographic systems are indeed separate systems with different requirements, data bases and organizational channels). The first task of this group would be to describe adequately the present positive intelligence biographic systems in each agency. This would then be used as the basis for making recommendations for improvement.

(2) Establish a separate task group to:

(a) Plan for the immediate implementation of a telecommunication network for transmission of requests and responses in machine language between agencies in the National Agency Check system.

(b) Concurrently with the above, develop standard rules for recording of personal names

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- 3 -

and other identifying data to be used in inter-agency queries and responses.

(c) Describe adequately the present CI/Security systems in each agency.

(d) Develop recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the NAC system.

(e) Operate full time until the above tasks are completed.

(3) In order to coordinate the efforts of these two task groups and to preclude domination of either group by any one agency, we recommend that the Chief of both task groups be a member of the CODIB Support Staff.

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Chief, CODIB Support Staff

Attachment: A/S

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
        1 - Secretary, CODIB
        1 - Chrono
        1 - CSS

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CSS/MM-76
7 April 1966
Attachment

CODIB SUPPORT STAFF COMMENTS ON
FINAL REPORT OF TASK TEAM V - BIOGRAPHICS*

1. Perhaps the major deficiency in the Final Report of Task Team V
is that it does not present a sufficiently comprehensive picture of indi-
vidual biographic intelligence processing organizations. Thus it is
neither a useful tool for users/researchers of biographic information nor
does it provide an adequate basis for sound recommendations for improving
the systems. In fact, some of the recommendations (i.e., 3, 7, & 8) are
presented without any discussion from which such recommendations could arise.
Recommendations 5 and 6 would give to the CODIB Support Staff the task of
finishing the work for Task Team V, i.e., completing the description of
the present systems in sufficient detail to be useful as a research tool or
in making recommendations for improvements. *The Task Team V Report does not respond to its own Terms of Reference.*

2. Other deficiencies discussed below are referenced to specific
paragraphs of Task Team V Approved Terms of Reference (CODIB-D-111/1.5/3,
19 January 1965).

a. (Para B. 1)** The files of Project White Stork (FTD), Cross
Check (FTD/LOC), and Passport and Visa (State) are "significant indexes"
and are "routinely consulted" but no information is contained on them in the
report. Also the team's definition of what constitutes a significant index
actually eliminates a number of biographic files which are important to
the Community.

b. (Para B. 2. a) Figures on size (and activity rates) are given
by organization rather than by individual index or biographic file within
each organization. In many cases there may be only one index, but in
several instances there are actually a number of different indexes, e.g.,
CIA/SR, CIA/BR, NSA/OCR. There is no way of telling this from the figures
given.

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*T/V/R-1, 1 February 1966

**See Annex 6 of the Report for copy of Terms of Reference.

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c. (Para B. 2. b) The only information contained in the report in response to this paragraph is a column in Annex 3 which indicates whether the individuals whose names are in the indexes are "predominately US, foreign or both." There is no other information on the "types of personalities covered: percentage of foreign vs. U.S. citizens, scientists, military, political, communist party, maritime, foreign intelligence services, agents, etc." There is no mention of what nationalities are represented in any index.

d. (Para B. 2. c) There is no information on the "depth of search on name variants" in any of the indexes. The only information on depth of search is the average number of searches per request, as shown in Annex 3, Col. 8. One cannot tell whether this indicates search on name variants, name variations or both.

e. (Para B. 2. d) There is no information presented on the "major requesters (against each index) or the proportion of requests from each."

f. (Para B. 2. e) There is practically no discussion of the "methods of communicating requests and responses" other than a statement (p 11 para 5) that "there are literally dozens of name check request forms now being utilized by the various agencies," and that "certain basic data such as name, place of birth, date of birth, service serial number, social security number, sex, etc., were included on each form." The Team "considered a study of the need for a single name check form to be used by the various agencies," but then considered it "more important to examine the data elements used and what rules should be applied to their control." The Team did nothing further about either of these problems except to propose an approach to recording of personal names. From the absence of discussion on communication of requests by electrical/electronic methods and from Recommendation 2 (page 4), one could assume that telecommunication facilities are not now being utilized. However, the Army counterintelligence and security records facility at Ft. Holabird has been receiving requests and transmitting responses in machine language over telecommunication links for several years. Air Force and Navy counterintelligence and security records are now being merged with the Army records in one facility to serve all of DoD via telecommunication links.

g. (Para B. 2. f) Annex 4 contains a listing of the data elements that may be recorded by each agency. However, the report contains no information regarding the rules applied to the recording of data elements in any agency or even whether there are any rules.

h. (Para B. 2. g) There are no "descriptions of input, maintenance and search processing" as practiced by each system or agency.

i. (Para B. 2. h) There is no discussion of "requirements for submission of requests" to any index.

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j. (Para C. 1) The report does not "examine costs, methodology or prospects for biographic systems now _undergoing_ mechanization." Nor does it examine these factors in sufficient detail to be helpful to an agency which may be _considering_ automation. It does mention (p 1 para 2) that there are "profound, complex problems and significant costs," but it does not examine these problems carefully nor even mention the costs.

k. (Para C. 2) The report states (p 2 para 9) that "the central problem in any large name index used for _name searching_ is the way in which personal names are recorded, filed, and searched," and then presents, in Annex 2, a "Proposed Approach to the Machine Recording of Personal Names." Beyond that, however, it does very little to "identify the basic problems to be faced and areas where policy decisions are required by each agency in planning for mechanization."

l. (Para C. 3) This is a very important paragraph in the Terms of Reference, and the report pays very little attention to it except to note (p 2 para 9) that "the success of an improved interagency name check exchange system based on telecommunications coupled with computer search _requires_ a common approach to recording of personal names and certain additional basic identifying data." It does not specify what the additional data are nor make any attempt to arrive at a common approach to any data elements other than name.

m. (Para D) The report does not "outline policy objectives for the Community" (except perhaps for Recommendation 1, and that has already been a USIB policy since August 1962 as stated in USIB-D-39.5/15). It does not give "generalized projections of cost, manpower and time required to meet these objectives," nor does it "include specific guidelines for agencies to follow in systems planning and development."

3. In short, it appears to us that the Terms of Reference, which the Team spent a great deal of time preparing, were practically ignored.

3 ⁄4. Below are comments on each of the Recommendations contained in the report. (pp 4-5)   _(USIB-D-39.5/15)_

a. Recommendation 1. The essentials of this recommendation have been USIB policy since 1962, not only for mechanization of biographic indexes but other areas as well. Why ask USIB to approve now what it already approved four years ago? Furthermore, many of the agencies which have biographic responsibilities are now moving rapidly toward mechanization. A notable exception is FBI, which is giving very serious thought to the problem but is prevented from doing much because of budgetary considerations. It may be true that "no major name index in the Intelligence Community has yet been fully automated," and "therefore, proof of success has not been conclusively demonstrated." (p 2 para 8) However, these statements are somewhat misleading. There are several name indexes outside of the Intelligence Community which have been fully automated and which are _conclusively_ successful. One of these, the National Drivers Registration Service (NDRS), Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D. C., with an index of about three million records,

receives up to 100,000 requests per day and responds within 24 hours. Most
of the members of the Team visited the NDRS and were aware of its capabi-
lities. The point to be made here is that success in this field has been
achieved and we should press forward rather than adopt a go-slow or wait-
and-see attitude. The report could have pointed out that there are still
about eight million typed biographic index cards being created each year and
that to convert just these cards to machine language will cost the agencies
approximately $800,000. Most of this annual cost could have been saved if
the agencies had converted to machine-language recording procedures. The
longer they wait the greater will be the loss in conversion costs.

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        b. Recommendation 2. In our judgment it is a needless exercise
to "request each agency to study the feasibility of establishing telecommuuni
cation links within the National Agency Check Complex." The feasibility of
such links is already well established. The Army has been receiving requests
on IBM cards from its field offices via transceiver for several years.
Transit time has been reduced from days to minutes. A network similar to
the Army system could be installed now between all agencies in the NAC
system in a matter of days using existing telephone lines, for the vast
majority of the requests and responses. All it takes is a desire on the part
of the agencies to do so. There is no need whatever to wait for a feasibi-
lity study by each agency or for any agency to complete, or even start, the
mechanization of its internal system before establishing telecommunication
links for transmission of requests and replies in machine language between
agencies. It appears obvious from the report that something should be done
now to improve the response time which averages about nine days between any
two agencies. The time required to obtain responses from all agencies
which receive a typical request averages much greater than nine days, even
for those cases where all responses show that there is no derogatory infor-
mation on record (no-record responses). This response time could easily be
reduced to one day with the use of readily-available equipment and at no
significant increase in cost over the present archaic system. (Rental of
eight terminals and the connecting lines should not exceed $3,000 per month.)
Furthermore, since the requests and responses would be transmitted in machine
language, there should be additional savings. The machine language cards
could be used by the requesting agency either in a machine index or a manual
index, and there would not be the the additional expense later of converting
to machine language when the system is mechanized. There would be no need
to type the requests on one of the dozens of request forms now being used.
One keypunching would provide both an index card and a request card. If the
receiving agency has a mechanized index, it would not have to convert the
typed requests to machine language before processing. The report states
(p 2 para 7) that "it is difficult to measure the actual loss to the govern-
ment...because of the slowness of the /present/ system." It thus implies
that these losses are substantial. Therefore, it seems to us that we should
recommend that the agencies press forward now with haste to implement a
system for transmission of requests and responses in machine language between
agencies, at least those in the NAC system. An effective system could have
been in operation years ago. In our judgment any further delay is not only
unwarranted, but unconscionable.

c. <u>Recommendation 3.</u> We agree wholeheartedly with the idea that the LDX (or similar) system should connect agencies in the Washington area engaged in production or use of positive Biographic Intelligence. However, there is no discussion in the report of what the LDX system is, where it is now installed, what the costs are, what its advantages are, what improvement could be obtained by its extension, what use rates could be expected, etc. The report does state (p 16 para e) that "the present communications between agencies is not adequate for quick exchange of classified information," but this hardly seems sufficient background discussion for arriving at Recommendation 3.

d. <u>Recommendation 4.</u> We feel strongly that the agencies should agree <u>now</u> to a standard method of recording personal names and other identifying data elements before mechanized systems now under development or contemplated in several agencies get locked in concrete so hard that it will be difficult at best and perhaps impossible to get them to change to a standard method. We further believe that the Intelligence Community should lead other government agencies in this regard rather than have standards developed under BoB sponsorship imposed upon us. If we had standards, it might be possible to get them accepted by the rest of the government. Why should we take such a laissez-faire attitude on these problems when the report itself says (p 11 para 5) "those considerations /data elements used and what rules should be applied to their control/become increasingly critical as the agencies move toward greater use of machine language." Now is the time to act, not some years hence when it will be too late or at least very expensive.

e. <u>Recommendation 5.</u> This recommendation would require the CODIB Support Staff to describe the present biographic systems in each agency in sufficient detail to serve as a useful tool for biographic analysts and other users of biographic intelligence. This, in our judgment, should have been one of the first tasks to be accomplished by the Task Team which, in its early days, had representatives from each of the major biographic collections in Washington. Even at the conclusion of the Task Team's effort, few, if any, members had acquired a detailed knowledge of the "characteristics of <u>each</u> major collection and the procedures and channels for getting service <u>from</u> each." How can we <u>ever</u> develop a biographic intelligence processing plan until we ~~have described~~, or at least have detailed knowledge of, the characteristics of each of the present systems? The Team report does not ~~even~~ tell us how a single biographic data element is recorded in any one of the biographic collections. We have no argument about the necessity for a detailed description of present systems. The question is how to get it done now. We do not believe that the Task Team approach is a good method. On the other hand, the CODIB Support Staff does not have sufficient resources at present to do the job in a reasonable time. We believe that if the job is to be done at all, it should be done by persons detailed to the task full time until it is completed. Maintenance of the publication, if desired, might then be accomplished by the CODIB Support Staff.

f. <u>Recommendation 6</u>. If the Task Team believes that it is
desirable for "agencies which are developing new computer data files" to be
informed of the "format and coverage requirements of others in the community,"
why did they not examine and report at least some of the formats and cover- **ILLEGIB**
age requirements while they had representatives together from the major
biographic collections in Washington who could have provided much of this
information? We believe strongly that all of the agencies should be con-
tinuously aware of what each of the other agencies is doing in the biographic
field. Format and coverage requirements are only two of the items about
which they should be informed on a continuing basis. This kind of information
should have been included in descriptions of ongoing systems and incorporated
in the Team report. Right during the time the Team was deliberating, several
developments were started which will result eventually in computerized bio-
graphic data files, e.g., Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, DoD and COINS. Others were already underway, e.g., CIA/RID, CIA/OS,
CIA/CHIVE. These developments all appear to be going in their own
independent directions without the benefit of any help or guidance from each
other or from the Task Team V Final Report.

g. <u>Recommendation 7</u>. This may be an excellent recommendation,
but how are we to judge since there is no discussion of it in the text. What
are the "needs of the Community?" What is DIA doing now? What use is DIA
making of open source material now? What are the deficiencies in the DIA
program? How should the program be expanded? We can already visualize
Gen. Carroll's reaction to this presumptious recommendation. It should be
backed up with solid evidence that such a recommendation is valid, and not
manufactured out of thin air.

h. <u>Recommendation 8</u>. This recommendation would give to another
team, or its successor, the task of developing a portion of a biographic
intelligence processing plan but does not give it sufficient specifics to
enable it to know what is needed. The text states (p 16 para f) that "there
is an extensive but insufficiently coordinated effort to bring under control
scientific information from open sources" which "results in the creation of
a great deal of personality information on scientists at all levels of
significance." Other than the statement that this effort is "insufficiently
coordinated," there is no discussion of what is being done now, what is
wrong with the present system, or what additional is needed. One gets the
impression from this statement that lack of coordination may result in a
lot of duplicate information. This may be true, but just the opposite may
also be true. Who can tell from the report. Neither Task Team III nor its
successor should be given this vaguely-defined task until there is a better
analysis of what is needed by whom. Even then, assigning it to another
Task Team is not the most desirable of several alternatives.

i. <u>Recommendation 9</u>. We believe that there is much need for
persons engaged in a common cause to get together periodically to find out
what others are doing. One of the most significant achievements of Task

Team V was that the members got to know each other and something of what was going on in the other agencies. A seminar similar to the one recommended here was a major contributor to this achievement. However, we believe that this mechanism should be an adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, a comprehensive description of the biographic community and a biographic intelligence processing plan.

4. 5. As indicated by the footnote on page 2 of the report, much of the reported data is no longer valid. Reference to Annex 3, Biographic Index Facts Summary, indicates that some data in Cols. 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16 and probably others should now be changed. Before this report could reach USIB, more of the data will be invalid. Among other changes, the Army, Navy and Air Force index records are being converted to a standard format on IBM cards and merged. This project, which has been underway since mid-1965, will be finished very shortly if not already. ~~The report certainly should now reflect this development.~~ CIA/RID and CIA/OS, which together

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were converting to machine records even before the Task Team got underway. State Department Passport and Visa Records, the third largest in the government and which the Team ignored completely, are being automated and will have on-line query capability from field offices. This project has been underway for many months. Secret Service and I&NS both began planning to mechanize several months ago. The report should indicate the status of each of these mechanization efforts.